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ETHICS IN ADR: THE MANY "Cs" OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*

I have been teaching both alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") and professional responsibility for a long time, and I will
devote the majority of this essay to reporting on some of the enormous changes and developments in this field. However, I will begin with a mea culpa at a higher level of ethical consciousness than
the rules that govern us, or are about to govern us, typically use. I
have spent the last five years of my life writing ethical rules for
ADR, and I am worried about the future of this field. There are
many changes occurring in ADR, and I now fear that, because of
all the activity, we are about to encounter the possibility of "conflicts of laws" with respect to ethics in the practice of alternative
dispute resolution. If we do not already, we soon will have many
different rule systems governing our practice, some of which explicitly conflict with each other and others of which are implicitly
or indirectly in conflict.
This field, which I prefer to call "appropriate" dispute resolution,l was intended to be flexible, make the world a better place,
and encourage different models of problem solving-not only adversarial ones, but conciliatory ones. Yet appropriate dispute resolution is now becomipg as complex, law-laden, and law-ridden as
the traditional practice of law.
From the outset, I have been a strong proponent of the need for
rules, regulations, and best practices standards because I care that
ADR is practiced "appropriately." We now call it "appropriate
dispute resolution," rather than "alternative dispute resolution,"
precisely to signal that different processes may be appropriate for
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Visiting Professor,
Harvard Law School; Chair, Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution-Georgetown University Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in
ADR. Thanks to Meredith Weinberg for her research assistance. This essay is based
on transcribed remarks delivered at the Association of American Law Schools' Annual Meeting, Joint Session of the Sections on Professional Responsibility and Alternative Dispute Resolution.
1. See Albie M. Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fashioned Way-We Earn It!, 4 NEG. J. 55, 62 (1988) (introducing the phrase "appropriate
dispute resolution").
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different kinds of disputes or in different types of settings. By using that label, we also acknowledge that we must make choices
about how to conduct different processes appropriately. We are
looking for the most appropriate way to try to resolve disputes,
plan transactions, solve international crises, and deal with community and individual human problems. Therefore, ADR really is intended to encompass more than just alternatives to a litigation
system.
This broadening of ADR presents the most troubling of the issues in the development of the field in ethics, which is one of jurisdiction. Who has, or ought to have, ethical control over the
practice of this multi-disciplinary field, that draws from the teachings and standards of many different professional and non-professional structures and ideologies? There, too, mea culpa. I have
been published widely as someone who is concerned about the unauthorized practice of law? I do believe that some forms of evaluative mediation and, these days, hybrid forms of arbitration, multiparty dispute resolution, consensus building-many of the new
practices-ultimately prompt third-party neutrals to opine on the
law, suggest legal conclusions, or advise people in ways that, although they do not create a technical lawyer-client relationship, do
implicate the giving of legal advice and may cause some people to
rely inappropriately on the statements of third-party neutrals.
Thus, I am concerned about liability issues and whether some dispute resolution practitioners' activities constitute the unauthorized
practice of law. 3 I will not focus on that issue in this essay, other
than to recognize it as one of the issues posed by the question of
determining who ought to regulate this multi-disciplinary practice.
Moreover, for those lawyers who want to encourage non-lawyers
2. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation The Practice of Law?, ALTERNA.
TIVES, May 1996, at 57. Whenever I make arguments about the unauthorized practice
of law, I think of my good friend, co-mediator, and co-trainer, Howard Gadlin, who is
a psychologist by training. E.g., THE CONFLICf RESOLUTION INFORMATION SOURCE,
THE GUIDE TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACfITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS (containing Dr. Gadlin's biographical information), http://crinfo.orgldocuments/h-bio/Gadlin_H.htm. When I complain about non-lawyers opining on the law, Dr. Gadlin
suggests that perhaps lawyers should be charged with the unauthorized practice of
psychology, since they attempt to facilitate parties' communication with little or no
training and, often, little or no skill. For an effort to provide some communication
skills generically, see DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: How TO
DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (1999).
3. E.g., OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SEC'y, SUPREME COURT OF VA., GUIDE.
LINES ON MEDIATION AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACfICE OF LAW (1999) [hereinafter VIRGINIA GUIDELINES], http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/upl/preface.html.
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to contribute their additional learning and teaching, how should we
combine these multiple disciplines?4
Turning to the major ethical concerns in the practice of ADR, we
may simplify the discussion a bit by considering what I call the
"Four Cs of Ethics and ADR." The first "C," which is largely absent from the rules, is the issue of counseling about ADR. Every
lawyer ought to have an ethical obligation to counsel clients about
the multiple ways of resolving problems and planning transactions.
A few states have included this obligation in precatory language,S
although very few have done so in required language. 6 I think that
this ethical obligation should be mandatory, and I have suggested
this in my idealized Ten Commandments of Appropriate Dispute
Resolution. 7
The second "C" of ethics and ADR is confidentiality. Although
our current ethics rules do not address confidentiality in detail,8
there is much regulation of confidentiality issues at the state level,9
and there soon will be regulation at the federal level, as well.lO Indeed, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed a federal agency to
coordinate federal ADR,l1 and the Code of Federal Regulations
and Federal Register soon will contain proposed regulations for
confidentiality in federal ADRP These new regulations raise a
4. Several organizations have attempted to draft ethical rules to transcend disciplinary boundaries. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF
CONDuer FOR MEDIATORS (1994), http://www.adr.orglrules/ethics/standard.html.
5. See Marshall J. Breger, Should An Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of
ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2000).
6. Id. at 462 app.1.
7. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 167-68 (1999).
8. The current version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not treat
any of the substantial ethical issues with respect to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. The traditional protection of confidentiality of lawyers and clients, Rule 1.6,
applies only to those in the privity of lawyer-client relationships. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.6 (1999). 'IYpically, parties and third-party neutrals are not in
this lawyer-client relationship. Rule 2.2, which attempts to deal with the lawyer serving as "intermediary" between two clients, simply assumes that the clients have no
confidentiality as between them if they are both using the same attorney. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 2.2 (1999).
9. See e.g., NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PRAerlCE
AND POLICY (2d ed. 1994).
10. Notice, Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs,
65 Fed. Reg. 83,085 (Dec. 29, 2000).
11. FED. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE REASONABLE EXPEerATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIS.
PUTE RESOLUTION Aer OF 1996 (2000), http://www.financenet.gov/financenet/fed/
iadrwglconfid.pdf.
12. Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. at 83,085.
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whole host of issues for those of us who are interested in the law of
privilege, evidence, and the Freedom of Information Act. At both
the federal and state levels, the ethical issues about confidentiality
in ADR conflict with "sunshine laws" and other open government
policies,13 and demonstrate the competing values that inform
ADR. Again, the question remains: Who should resolve those
issues?
The debate over Rule 4.214 presents another interesting issue
with relevance to whether state ethics rules govern federal lawyers
and law enforcement officials. If the federal government has a regulatory scheme for confidentiality or other issues, what do state
ethics rules, state evidence rules, or state mediation privileges have
to do with ADR practice at the federal judicial or regulatory level?
These conflicts of laws/conflicts of rules issues are quite complex.
The Honorable Wayne Brazil, a former law professor and current
magistrate judge who developed one of the most advanced ADR
programs in the federal courts, is a notable founder in our field
who has had to deal with these issues. 15 In a recent case, Judge
Brazil addressed some of these questions about which level of regulation governs confidentiality of mediation in the federal courts. 16
This leads me into the third "C," conflicts of interest, as well as
into conflicts of rules and laws. We have multiple levels of regulation in ethics and ADR for conflicts of interest for third-party neu- .
trals, lawyers who participate as party representatives and
advocates, and former, present, and potentially future parties and
clients in ADR proceedings.
There are substantive laws, ethics rules, and court rules about
ADR and conflicts of interests at both the federal and state level.
13. See Charles Pou Jr., Ghandi Meets Elliot Ness: 5th Circuit Ruling Raises Concerns About Confidentiality in Federal Agency ADR, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter
1998, at 9 (discussing the balance between openness for oversight and confidentiality
for potentially volatile issues); Christopher Honeyman, Confidential, More or Less:
The Reality, and Importance, of Confidentiality is Often Oversold by Mediators and the
Profession, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 12 (arguing that claims of "confidentiality" can be exaggerated unnecessarily).
14. Rule 4.2 provides that "a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter," unless the lawyer is authorized by law or given consent by the
other lawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999).
15. E.g., WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITs: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT
ApPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1985);
WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE ApPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1988).
16. Olam v. Congo Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting the
tension between federal court rules that mandate confidentiality and state law).
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At the state level, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, and Texas have been most active in addressing potential
conflictsP These particular states are notable because they have
regulated conflicts of interest and confidentiality in substantive
statutes providing for ADR or mediation in evidentiary rules,18 as
well as in procedural court rules. 19 So there are both substantive
regulations, procedural rules, and court rules that exist at multiple
jurisdictional levels. Determining whether an arbitrator or mediator has a prohibited conflict of interest (involving a former, present, or potential future client) may require consultation with a
wide variety of rule systems, including formal law and the many
rules created by private associations of mediators and arbitrators. 2o
Because I have written elsewhere about the complexity of conflicts of interest issues in ADR,21 I will mention just some of the
key controversies. The major issue, both at the policy and rule
levels, is the extent to which the same individual should be allowed
to perform multiple roles as mediator and as advocate, at different
times and in different cases, in order to encourage the expanded
use of ADR. There is also a question of whether mediators, conciliators, arbitrators, and other dispute resolvers should be allowed to
practice in law firms with others who perform the more conventional advocate's role, sometimes for the same or adverse parties.
Under our current ethics rules for lawyers,22 this situation is very
problematic. Should a mediator preside over a matter in which
that mediator, or his or her partner, may later represent one of
those parties in either a related, substantially related, or unrelated
matter? Should there be a time frame limiting that representation,
17. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 9, at app.A (summarizing provisions of state
confidentiality statutes).
18. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 2025 (West 2000); see also ROGERS & McEwEN,
supra note 9, at app.A (detailing the evidentiary issues that arise in mediations in
areas such as discovery, evidence, public access, non-parties, and protective orders).
19. E.g., ADR L.R. 2-5(d) (N.D. Cal. 2000) (establishing procedure for determining conflicts of interest in ADR context).
20. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977), http://www.adr.org/roster/arbitrators/code.html.
21. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, New Issues, No Answers];
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1999) (describing prohibitions and
exceptions for conflicts of interest in representation); id. R. 1.12 (explaining rules of
representation for former judges and arbitrators).
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or should it be allowed to occur with client or party consent, or not
at all?
If you have not been following the debate, this is where I sometimes fear I have wasted the last five years of my life arguing with
the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct (the "Commission" or "Ethics 2000 Commission").23 In my view, many ethicists, professional responsibility
scholars, rule drafters, and practicing lawyers still do not get itthat is, they do not understand what ADR is all about. They do
not recognize how the conceptions, purposes, and information
flows of ADR practice differ from those of more conventional legal practice. At the same time, there is a risk that conventional
advocates will use ADR to "game" the system, leaking information
and manipulating the processes in ways that do need to be
regulated.
The current report of the Ethics 2000 Commission, which will be
presented to the ABA House of Delegates, has at least three
ADR-related provisions. First, the new Preamble to the Rules recognizes that lawyers may serve as third-party neutrals and may exercise peacemaking, as well as advocacy, functions. 24 This is a
useful, if mostly symbolic, step forward.
Second, the newly proposed Rule 2.4 formally recognizes the
role of the third-party neutral within the context of services performed by lawyers. 25 The Rule only states that third-party neutrals
may be used, and that lawyers behaving as third-party neutrals
should describe their function and explain that they are not representatives of the parties. The Rule suggests that lawyers serving as
third-party neutrals should advise unrepresented parties to consult
with lawyers if they either want legal advice or wish to understand
the details and complexities of ADR processes. There were additional proposals about what might have been included in the rule,
such as whether mediators and other third-party neutrals could
23. The Ethics 2000 Commission has completed its report of proposed changes to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which will go to the ABA House of Delegates this summer. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT, FINAL RULES PART Two (Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.org!
cpr/e2k-final_rules2.html (providing the proposed rule changes and full Commission
report).
24. [d., Preamble [3].
25. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, PROPOSED RULE 2.4 (Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.org!cpr/e2krule24.html.
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give legal information or advice,26 as well as whether mediators
could serve as scriveners for agreements, drafting mediated agreements for the parties without running afoul of conflicts of interests
or other rules?7 Nevertheless, in the interest of simplicity, these
suggestions were not incorporated into the final proposed rules.
The third issue treated by the proposed new rules is a departure
from current standards or silences on the issue of conflicts of interest. The newly proposed Rule 1.12 treats mediators as arbitrators
and judges have been treated by the rules in the past. The rule
permits screening, which allows an attorney who serves as a mediator in a law firm to be screened so that his or her partners may
subsequently represent one of the parties in the mediator's matter
without obtaining client consent. 28
I still think that the Commission does not understand some of
the subtleties and complicated issues involved in determining
whether matters are substantially related, unrelated, or even the
same for purposes of determining conflicts of interest. In a sense,
this new screening rule actually permits a troubling "gray area" in
which a conflict still may exist, such as when a screened mediator's
partner serves as an advocate in an adversarial proceeding after an
unsuccessful mediation in that same matter. The Commission simply chose to draw some bright-perhaps too bright-lines and
treat mediators and arbitrators in the same way, where perhaps
there are some real differences.
26. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators state that mediators never
should give legal advice. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N ET AL., supra note 4, Rule VI,
cmt.4. The Virginia standards state that mediators can give legal information, but not
legal advice. VIRGINIA GUIDELINES, supra note 3. The distinction between these two
has always eluded me, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, New Issues, No Answers, supra note
21, at 454.
27. The Judicial Council of Virginia has adopted ethical standards stating that,
although mediators are not prohibited from drafting agreements between parties,
they are obligated to encourage review by independent counsel prior to either party
signing the agreement. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VA., STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS (Oct. 2000), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/soe/soe.htm.
28. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, PROPOSED RULE 1.12 (Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2krule112.html. The proposed rule contains some ambiguity. It is "clear" ethical practice
that mediators almost never serve as advocates in an actual, or substantially related,
case that they have mediated. Current ethical disputes are about cases involving the
same clients or parties in slightly or very different matters. From these principles, it
would seem that a mediator's partners also should not be allowed to serve as representatives in the same or a substantially similar matter (in other words, the old imputation rule should apply here), but this result is not clear from the current version of
the rule.
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The rule also singles out "partisan arbitrators" as being similar to
advocates, even though partisan arbitrators are an entirely separate
group currently receiving a great deal of practitioner, if not scholarly, attention. Ethically, is the partisan arbitrator to be "just another lawyer" on the case, subject to the ethics rules for advocates,
or is the partisan arbitrator to be more neutral?29
I want to explain why this screening rule is so significant. I personally did a l80-degree turn on this issue. As a strict ethicist and
someone who deplored conflicts of interest in conventional adversary practice, I began my work in this field thinking that screens for
mediators and arbitrators should not be permitted. I have since
changed my mind completely, for policy reasons. Specifically, that
policy should encourage both traditional adversary practice and the
fourth "e," conciliation, within a single law firm.
The practice of law will be better informed if people are permitted to be mediators, arbitrators, and advocates within the same
practice units, which in turn will provide greater information resources for clients and lawyers. My utopian hope is that the culture
of law practice might change if third-party neutrals, conciliators,
and advocates inhabit the same offices. Thus, I have spent a fair
amount of the last few years trying to get the screen provision put
in place.
I am concerned that there still are complicated issues not covered by the current draft of the rule. As an illustration, a few
months ago I was training some extremely sophisticated intellectual property lawyers in mediation, and I talked to them about
these ethics issues. Professional responsibility teachers will be
shocked to learn that when I described the proposed screen of the
new Rule 1.12 as a positive phenomenon, these practicing intellectual property lawyers, who serve as both advocates and mediators,
understood this new rule as prohibiting them from engaging in
their current multiple kinds of practice, where they previously had
not been cognizant of the potential conflicts of interests issues. In
other words, they had not even conceptualized the possibility that
when a lawyer serves as a mediator in one matter, his or her partner cannot represent one of the parties in that mediation in a related, or even an unrelated, litigation matter.
29. See Lawrence J. Fox, The Last Thing Dispute Resolution Needs is Two Sets of
Lawyers for Each Party, in CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTO THE 21ST
CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND ADR 47, 4748 (2001).
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It was quite clear to me that these senior distinguished intellectual property lawyers, who were members of the pre-Watergate
generation that had not taken professional responsibility courses,
did not even recognize a conflicts of interest issue when they were
in the midst of one. It was surprising, given all the bar associations'
continuing legal education requirements, how little these lawyers
knew about conflicts of interest. Most of these quite prominent
lawyers have been mediating and representing parties without using screens and thinking the entire time that this was perfectly permissible. When I said, "The good news is that now you are going
to be able to perform both of these roles, provided you screen in
appropriate cases," they looked at me in horror, realizing that they
would now need to engage in all the complexities involved in
screening, such as the segregation of files and fees and the prohibition on discussions with firm partners on screened matters.
I offer that example to demonstrate: (a) the lack of knowledge
that still exists about our very basic rules of conflict of interest, and
(b) the significant effort that will be required to apply the complex
conflict of interest rules and screening to the ADR environment.
Finally, I will review a number of other very interesting developments in the regulation of ethical issues in ADR. For the last five
years, I have had the honor to chair the Commission on Ethics and
Standards of Practice in ADR ("CPR-Georgetown Commission"),30 which develops some best practices in the field. This is
where my heart really is, in trying to make the field responsible for
acting appropriately and with good practices, while acknowledging
that, perhaps, we are still too new and young to fully regulate what
ought to happen. At the same time, we have been concerned with
the quality of the field, and, in particular, with the role of lawyers
who practice ADR in its myriad forms.
The CPR-Georgetown Commission has published two different
documents,31 which I think are quite useful for teaching profes-

30. The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution-Georgetown
University Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR [hereinafter
CPR-Georgetown Commission] is co-sponsored by the Center for Public Resources
in New York and Georgetown University and funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
31. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, PROPOSED MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS
THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL (1999) [hereinafter CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, PROPOSED
MODEL RULE], http://www.cpradr.org; CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, DRAFT PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2000) [hereinafter CPR-GEORGETOWN
COMM'N, DRAFT PRINCIPLES], http://www.cpradr.org.
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sional responsibility to students and training practicing mediators,
arbitrators, and other third-party neutrals.
The first document, which has been out for about a year and a
half, discusses our proposed ethics rules for lawyers who act as
third-party neutrals. This document concludes that mediators may
be lawyers and, therefore, they should be subject to all the ethics
rules governing lawyers who practice law or any other profession. 32
In a sense, this proposed rule, though far-reaching and complex,
evades the question of what happens when mediators are not lawyers. It fails to address the potential competition that we lawyermediators may have with those who mediate from another discipline, and who may not be subject to our conflict of interest rules,
fee rules, and other ethics rules.
The second document, Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations,33 is somewhat inspired by the wonderful work of legal
ethicist Ted Schneyer.34 This document is interesting because no
other body has attempted a similar project. Essentially, Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations is an attempt to recognize
one of the major changes in the legal profession, that is, that since
organizations are providing legal services, there are situations in
which these organizations should be responsible, both in liability
and in ethics discipline, for the actions of their member service
providers. The document also specifies some best practices for organizations that hold themselves out as either providers of ADR
assistance, referrals, or direct services. These organizations would
include such entities as courts, which maintain rosters of mediators
and arbitrators; solo practitioners, like me, who hold themselves
out as mediators, arbitrators, and consensus builders; and other
third-party neutrals.
Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations has not been
adopted by any regulatory entity, jurisdiction, state, or professional
association, and so has no force of law. However, it does try to
elucidate a series of best and responsible practices involving such
issues as a graduated scale of information to be provided to parties
in ADR. 35 For example, if parties in the dispute have greater involvement in choosing their provider of ADR services, because
32. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, PROPOSED MODEL RULE, supra note 31.
33. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, DRAfT PRINCIPLES, supra note 31.
34. E.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the law firm's role in regulating ethical behavior of lawyers
and suggesting that discipline should be meted out at the firm level in appropriate
cases).
35. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, DRAfT PRINCIPLES, supra note 31.
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they reviewed resumes or interviewed candidates for mediators
and arbitrators, then the referral organization would have a concomitant lesser responsibility for the assigned ADR provider. If an
organization, like a court, assigns an ADR provider without party
choice or input, then that referral organization should assume
greater responsibility for ensuring competence, proper credentials,
and training, as well as for assuring that the assigned person provides ethically permissible services.
This is fairly controversial material. For example, those who
work in the dispute resolution field know the American Arbitration Association often handles complaints about conflicts of interest, including the circumstances under which an arbitrator should
reveal financial interest, past cases, or other conflicts that may affect the arbitrator's ability to remain neutral. An organization referring providers of dispute resolution services has an uncertain
responsibility in assigning a third-party neutral to a case, as this
activity is currently unregulated. However, several organizations
that maintain panels and lists of mediators, arbitrators, and other
third-party neutrals have promulgated their own internal ethical
regulations, though they vary widely.36
Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations also is concerned about quality control, particularly in information and competence. When an organization suggests an ADR process or
recommends a particular provider, it has an obligation, in the CPRGeorgetown Commission's view, to provide a lot of information
about what it all means-both information about the process itself,
the choice of neutral, and the type and quality of the neutral.
I would say, in a sense, there is a fifth "C" in the Ethics of ADR,
and that is choice. One of the values underlying Draft Principles
for ADR Provider Organizations recognizes the fact that parties
increasingly have less choice about whether to go to ADR and
which provider to use. Therefore, the entity recommending
ADR-or, to use another "C," coercing it, such as in the
mandatory referrals of some courts-should have some responsibility for assuring the competence and integrity of the process.
The CPR-Georgetown Commission's Draft Principles for ADR
Provider Organizations might be a useful document to teach and
study. In particular, it might be interesting for professional responsibility students to take a look at the larger question of entity or
organizational ethical responsibilities at the more general level and
36. E.g., JAMS-ENDISPUTE, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATORS, http://
www.jamsadr.comJethics_focarbs.asp; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N ET AL., supra note 4.
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then to examine the specifics to see whether they would make different choices in these areas than the CPR-Georgetown Commission has made.
Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations also contains a
very interesting taxonomy of all the different forms of ADR and all
the different kinds of provider organizations, including courts, public entities, administrative agencies, private individuals, lawyers,
and non-lawyers. It is a very nice way to educate people who do
not know much about the field.
For people who are primarily professional responsibility teachers, rather than ADR teachers, scholars, or practitioners, if you do
not learn this material, you are doing so at your own peril. This is
one of the many ways in which the legal profession and legal practice is changing dramatically. Virtually every state and federal
court requires some form of ADR at least to be considered by the
lawyers in a litigation matter,37 and, increasingly, transactions and
contracts contain ADR clauses. So if you teach professional responsibility, I urge you to get up to speed on the content of
ADR-its aspirations, visions, and hopes-and also to realize that
if you are looking for some interesting, complex, and new issues to
teach your students, you will not find a more fertile field for both
your mind and heart than that of thinking about the possible technical violations in ethics and what constitutes good practice in
ADR.

37. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, STATE STATUTES, http://www.adr.org (providing ADR statutes in all fifty states and the District of Columbia); 28 V.S.c. § 6S1(b)
(2000) (requiring all district courts to devise and implement ADR programs).
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